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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kenny Carl Reale appeals from the judgment of conviction and restitution
order entered upon his guilty plea to sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years
of age. Reale claims the district court erred in awarding restitution for lost wages
for the victim's mother and that the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Reale sexually abused eight year-old M.S. over the course of several days
when M.S. went to Reale's home to help clean.

The facts underlying Reale's

conviction for sexual abuse are as follows:
On July 23, 2013, in the morning, [M.S.'s mother] Kathryn
overheard Mr. Reale tell his home health nurse to come to his
house at 1700 that day. When the nurse told Mr. Reale she was on
her way, Kathryn said he became angry and insisted she not come
that day.
Kathryn said she allowed her daughter, eight year old [M.S.], to
stay at Mr. Reale's house that day to clean while she went home.
At 1600 hours, Kathryn picked [M.S.] up from Mr. Reale's
residence. She said [M.S.] told her, "Hurry, leave, I need to go to
the bathroom."
When [M.S. 's] father, Carter, got home, he asked her how her day
had been and she was very vague. Later, [M.S.] told her parents
what happened at Mr. Reale's home. She said he stretched with
her and, at one point, asked [M.S.] to take a shower with him. She
told him no. [M S.] showed her parents, using her mother's hand,
where Mr. Reale had touched her. She showed he had rubbed her
chest and vaginal area. [M.S.] said her clothes were on, even
though Mr. Reale had asked her to take them off.
[M.S.] stated Mr. Reale kissed her mouth, bare neck, bare chest,
and bare stomach. She said she saw his "privates." When Kathryn
asked [M.S.] what she meant, she stated his "main part" was
"sticking out of his underwear." Kathryn stated [M.S.] told her that,
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because of Mr. Reale's actions over the past few weeks, she had
been wearing tight clothes to his house because they were the
"wrong kind of clothes to stretch in."
On July 26, 201 Officer Gates spoke to Mr. Reale, who gave him
full access to his medical records from the VA Medical Center,
Boise. Mr. Reale stated he did not want to tell Officer Gates
anything for fear of not wording it correctly.
According to the medical records Officer Gates obtained from the
VA, Mr. Reale voluntarily admitted himself on July 23, 2013. The
records indicate "he fondled a prepubescent girl of which was
reported yesterday in ED by social work to authorities. Parents are
pressing charges for such." "Patient's son and wife have not been
exposed to this information and he feels overwhelmed by the
thought of this happening, as he is ashamed by his acts." "He feels
guilty and doesn't understand why he has had to struggle with this
problem." "He endorses these sexual attraction thoughts to be
chronic/pervasive, as intrusive" and "he would tend to use
masturbation as his compulsion to attenuate these thoughts." The
patient denied "flashbacks from Vietnam" and "saw very little
combat."
The records continue by saying Mr. Reale's son brought him to the
VA to be "fixed" and that "he states that he finally came to the
realization that something is wrong with him and that he needs help
when he touched a nine year old girl in the "crotch" "three days
ago." He said he "fantasizes about girls a large part of the time and
he has always had this problem."
(PSI, p.37.) 1 According to the "defendant's version" of events in the presentence
report, Reale explained, "My crime was the inapropriate touching of an 8 yr old
girl. On the day I question, specifically I placed a kiss on her short, on her croch
area. At which time, I because acutly aware of what I had done." (PSI, p.38
(verbatim).)

Page references to the Clerks' Record are as numbered on each page of the
DVD file captioned, "Appeal #41892 Shepard Reale 04032014."
Page
references to the Certificate of Exhibits, which includes the presentence report
("PSI"), and psychosexual evaluation ("PSE") are as they appear on each page
of the DVD file captioned "Appeal #41892 S. Reale Conf. Exh. 0415201."
1
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The state charged Reale with one count of lewd conduct with a minor
under sixteen years of age and one count of sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen years of age.

, pp.63-64.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Reale pied

guilty to sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age and the state agreed
to dismiss the lewd conduct count

(R., pp.92-93, 120.) The court imposed a

unified 15-year sentence with three years fixed.

(R., pp.112-118.)

After a

subsequent restitution hearing, the district court entered a memorandum decision
and judgment ordering Reale to pay M.S.'s mother, Kathryn, restitution for lost
wages in the amount of $3,315.68. (R., pp.140-150.) Reale filed a timely notice
of appeal. (R., pp.124-127, 152-155.)

3

ISSUES
Reale states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did substantial evidence support the restitution award of
$3315.68 to [M S.'s mother] for lost wages?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, upon
Mr. Reale following his plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a
child under sixteen years of age?

(Appellant's Brief, p.5 (explanation added).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Reale failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
awarding the victim's mother $3,315.68 in restitution for lost wages?

2.

Has Reale failed to show the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Reale Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding
The Victim's Mother $3,315.68 In Restitution For Lost Wages

A.

Introduction
The district court ordered Reale to pay $3,315.68 in restitution for the

wages lost by M.S.'s mother, Kathryn, on night shifts she missed so she could
attend court (and related) proceedings in Reale's case the following days. (R.,
pp.140-147; see Tr., p.71, L.17 - p.73, L.17.)

Reale asserts the district court

abused its discretion in ordering restitution for such lost wages.
Brief, pp.6-15.)

(Appellant's

According to Reale, "substantial evidence did not support the

restitution award of $3315.68 to [Kathryn] for lost wages, because the award was
for time she spent resting instead of going to work.

Alternatively, even if

[Kathryn's] time spent resting instead of going to work is awardable as restitution
for lost wages, substantial evidence did not support the full award of $3315.68."
(Appellant's Brief, p.6 (explanation added).)
Because the record substantially supports that the wages Kathryn lost by
not working her 12-hour night shifts as a hospital charge nurse in order to get
some sleep before attending the next days' court hearings were proximately
caused by the crime for which Reale pleaded guilty, the court's order of
restitution is appropriate.
B.

Standard Of Review
The district court has discretion at sentencing "to determine whether

restitution is appropriate and, if so, to set the amount."
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State v. Houser, 155

Idaho 521, 524, 314 P.3d 203, 206 (Ct App. 2013) (citation omitted). The court
determines the amount of economic loss suffered by and to be awarded to the
crime victim "upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the trial court by
the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence investigator."

State v.

Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing I.C. §
19-5304 (6)). Factual findings by the sentencing court as to restitution "will not
be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Straub,
153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013) (citing State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho
599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011 )).

"Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion."

!sL.

(citation omitted). The Court on appeal "will not overturn an order of restitution
unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Lombard, 149 Idaho at 822, 242 P.3d at
192 (citation omitted).

C.

The Record Supports That Kathryn's Economic Losses Were Proximately
Caused By The Crime For Which Reale Pleaded Guilty
Reale argues that Kathryn is not entitled to restitution for lost wages

because the work hours she missed did not directly conflict with the court
proceedings she attended. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) He asserts that Kathryn's
"choice to spend time resting instead of going to work was an intervening,
superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's criminal
conduct and [Kathryn's] loss of wages." Reale contends:
A reasonable person in Mr. Reale's position, "making an
inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might
produce, would not have reasonably expected" [Kathryn] to miss
partial or entire shifts at work to attend court proceedings that
occurred not during, but after those shifts. Thus, he choice to
6

spend time resting instead of going to work was an intervening,
superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr.
Reale's criminal conduct and [Kathryn's] loss of wages.
(Appellant's Brief, p.12 (citations and parentheticals omitted).)
Reale's claim that Kathryn's missed work was not caused by his crime is
incorrect. Restitution may be ordered for a victim's economic loss or injury "only
if there is a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant was
convicted and the loss suffered by the victim." State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491,
495, 283 P.3d 808, 812 (Ct. App. 2012) citing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249
P.3d at 401 ). Causation includes actual and proximate cause.

kl

"[P]roximate

cause deals with whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the loss would flow
from the criminal conduct."

kl

"The proximate cause inquiry requires a court to

determine" if the losses at issue were "so highly unusual 'that a reasonable
person, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might
produce, would not have reasonably expected'" them to be incurred.

kl

A

defendant is liable for restitution "if either the possible consequence might
reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the
possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act." Houser, 155 Idaho
at 525, 314 P.3d at 207. As recently explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals in
State v. Davis, --- P.3d ----, 2014 WL 2218970 *2 (Idaho App.):
"An intervening, superseding cause generally refers to an
independent act or force that breaks the causal chain between the
defendant's culpable act and the victim's injury." State v. Lampien,
148 Idaho 367, 374-75, 223 P.3d 750, 757-58 (2009). The
intervening cause "becomes the proximate cause of the victim's
injury and removes the defendant's act as the proximate cause,"
but to relieve a defendant of liability, "the intervening cause must be
an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence."
Id.
If the
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possible consequence might reasonably have been contemplated
or the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the
kind that could result from his act, the defendant remains criminally
liable. Id.
Reale's argument is grounded on the unrealistic premise that the need to
sleep is not foreseeable.

It was foreseeable that (a) M.S.'s mother, Kathryn,

would feel it necessary to attend court proceedings and CARES appointments
with or for M.S. 2 and (b) that because Kathryn works at night, when most other
people are sleeping, would lose work hours in order to replace the sleep she was
losing as a result of attending such proceedings and appointments. The district
court embraced the reasonableness and foreseeability of each of these steps,
stating:
Both Kathryn and Carter seek lost income and wages as
victims' restitution. Kathryn seeks lost wages in the amount of
$3,315.68 . .
Lost wages are expressly authorized to be recovered as
restitution. I. C. § 19-5304(1 ). Kathryn testified that her lost wages
were the direct result of her attending with her daughter, M.S., at
the CARES Interview and her physical examination after disclosure
of the defendant's criminal conduct. [Tr., p.72, Ls.13-23; p.78, Ls.814; p.80, L.10 - p.2.J She also testified that her lost wages were the
direct result of her attendance at multiple court hearings after the
criminal charges were filed against the defendant. [Tr., p.72, Ls.1321; p.77, L.19 - p.78, L.18; p.80, L.10 - p.83, L.24.] Kathryn's
attendance at CARES and the multiple court proceedings are a
direct and proximate cause of the defendant's criminal conduct.
State v. Houser, 155 Idaho at 525-527, 314 P .3d at 207-21 l

2

See State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521, 528, 314 P.3d 203, 210 (Ct. App. 2013)
("A crime victim may want to be present at any proceeding that substantially
impacts the case, the victim's relationship with the perpetrator, or any further risk
to the victim .... Therefore, we hold that Douglas's choice to attend most, if not
all, of the proceedings was not an intervening, superseding cause that severed
the causal link between Donald's criminal behavior and Douglas's loss of
wages.").
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The court does recognize that the court hearings in the
defendant's case were generally held between 9:00 a.m. and 12:00
p.m. and that these hearings were not held during Kathryn's hours
of work (7:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m
[Tr., p.72, Ls.1-2; p.80, Ls.14-16.]
Kathryn took off time for court so that she could be prepared for
court if her participation in the proceedings may be required. [Tr.,
p.85, Ls.6-16.] This is understandable given the fact that she works
evenings and would have little rest after her work day before
attending court. [Tr., p.72, L.17 - p.73, L.21; p.81, Ls.7-23; p.83,
L.19 - p.85, L.16.] It is not unreasonable for her to take off time to
be prepared for court. For example there was a bond hearing
scheduled and certainly she could have had reason to testify or
participate in such a hearing. [Tr., p.83, L.7 - p.85, L.16.] Kathryn
took her time off in 4 hour blocks and did her best to find coverage
for her blocks of time to avoid taking off more time than necessary
to be prepared and attentive in court. [Tr., p.73, Ls.2-5; p.81, L.16 p.83, L.18.] State v. Houser, 155 Idaho at 526-527, 314 P.3d at
210-211. The court does find that under the circumstances the lost
wages incurred by Kathryn are reasonable and a direct result of the
defendant's criminal conduct. The court does therefore award to
Kathryn $3,315.68 as and for lost wages.
(R., pp.143-144 (emphasis original; bracketed references to the record).) The
district court's determination that Kathryn's

request for lost wages was

reasonable and a direct result of Reale's criminal conduct is supported by
substantial evidence in the record. See Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at
276.
As the mother of the victim of Reale's crime, Kathryn attended the CARES
appointments and court proceedings in order to stay informed about the case
and to be prepared, if needed, to give her input.

Criminal proceedings -

including the pretrial and trial phases - and the victim's attendance of those
proceedings, are foreseeable results of a defendant's criminal conduct.

See

Houser, 155 Idaho at 528, 314 P.3d at 210. Kathryn needed sleep, just as any
other person, in order to be alert and well-rested for the following mornings'

9

CARES appointments and court proceedings. That her work hours were not at
the same time as the court proceedings does not show error in the district court's
finding of causation.
Next, Reale argues that even if Kathryn's "time spent resting instead of
going to work is awardable as restitution for lost wages[,]" the "voluntary choices
of the third party or parties who decided not to switch schedules and cover
[Kathryn's] shifts constituted an intervening, superseding cause that precludes a
finding that Mr. Reale's criminal conduct was the proximate cause of [Kathryn's]
economic loss for those entire 12-hour shifts."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13-14.)

Reale is incorrect.
That Kathryn, a hospital labor and delivery charge nurse (see Tr., p.71,
L.19 - p.73, L.5), was unable to find someone to switch shifts with her (or 4-hour
blocks of shifts), is not "'an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence[,]'"
therefore, it is not an intervening and superseding cause. See Davis, --- P.3d at ---, 2014 WL 2218970 *2 (quoting State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374-75, 223
P.3d 750, 757-58 (2009). Kathryn testified:
I tried to find people to switch schedules with me, but it's kind
of hard to do. Being a charge nurse, there's very few people you
can pull from to ask for help.
(Tr., p.73, Ls.2-5.)

From Kathryn's testimony, the district court reasonably

concluded, "Kathryn took her time off in 4 hour blocks and did her best to find
coverage for her blocks of time to avoid taking off more time than necessary to
be prepared and attentive in court." (R., p.143; see Tr., p.73, Ls.2-5; p.81, L.16p.83, L.18.)

Kathryn's inability to find another labor and delivery charge nurse

10

willing

switch shifts with her was not an unforeseeable and extraordinary

occurrence, and therefore, is not an intervening and superseding cause of her
lost wages. See Davis, ---

3d at----, 2014 WL

18970 *2.

The record supports the district court's determination that Kathryn's lost
wages, due to her need to replace sleep lost as a result of attending the criminal
(and CARES) proceedings, were reasonably foreseeable, and thus causally
connected to Reale's criminal conduct.

Additionally, Kathryn's inability to find

another charge nurse to switch shifts with was not an intervening and
superseding cause. Reale has failed to show the court abused its discretion in
awarding restitution as requested by the prosecution.

Accordingly, Reale's

challenge to the order of restitution should be rejected.

11.
Reale Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Reale contends the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive

considering any view of the facts, and that the court abused its sentencing
discretion by not giving adequate consideration to the following alleged mitigating
factors: his low risk to reoffend, his history of being sexually abused as a child,
his physical health problems, and his grief over the illness and death of his wife.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-20.) The record supports the sentence imposed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion."
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State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted)

"In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its

view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ."

C.

kl

Reale's Unified 15-Year Sentence With Three Years Fixed For Sexual
Abuse Of A Child Under 16 Is Not Excessive
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."

Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted).
"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an
independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest."

kl

A review of the record demonstrates that a unified 15-year sentence with

three years fixed for sexually abusing eight-year-old M.S. is not excessive.
Reale has failed to establish otherwise.
The four objectives of sentencing are well-established.

They are "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be
sufficient."

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)

(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241, 804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App.
1991 )). In imposing sentence, the court noted the objectives of sentencing and
the statutory factors to consider in determining whether to place Reale on
probation or to impose a sentence of incarceration. (Tr., p.52, L.18 - p.53, L.8.)
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sum, Reale was a 67 year-old man who sexually abused M.S. by
kissing her on her mouth, bare neck, bare chest, and bare stomach, and rubbed
her chest and vaginal area. (PSI, pp.36-37.) Reale asked M.S. to shower with
him and take her clothes off, but she refused to do so. (Id.) However, M.S. saw
Reale's "main part" sticking out of his underwear. (Id.) Days after the "rubbing"
incident, Reale went to the VA hospital and admitted to nursing staff that he
recently touched the crotch of a prepubescent girl, and that he struggles with
fantasizing about young girls. (Id.; R., p.22.)
At the sentencing hearing, the district court emphasized that its primary
sentencing concern was the protection of society, and stated the obvious -- "a
young child should never be subject to the type of conduct that is the factual
basis for this plea."

(Tr., p.52, L.21 - p.53, L.20.)

Reale's argument that his

sentences are excessive in light of his low risk to reoffend, his victimization of
sexual abuse as a child, his physical health problems, and his grief over his
wife's illness and death, is not persuasive.
Although the psychosexual evaluation ("PSE") conducted by Dr. Linda
Hatzenbuehler concluded Reale is a low risk to reoffend in relation to other
sexual offenders, the district court noted her reservations about Reale's
motivation for treatment, reiterating that "'Mr. Reale does not think he needs
treatment to help him cope with his sexual behavior.

Moreover, he feels

victimized and does not take full responsibility for his behavior."' (Tr., p.56, L.24 p.57, L.2 (quoting PSE, p.25).) The court found, as did Dr. Hatzenbuehler, that
Reale continued to minimize and rationalize his behavior. (Tr., p.55, Ls.16-22.)

13

Hatzenbuehler stated, "[Reale] accused the parents of his victim as being
'after him.' He also accused his victim's father of 'setting him up' for his offense
putting him in a situation in which he was vulnerable to committing his
offense." (PSE, p.12.)

Dr. Hatzenbuehler concluded, "In this [sic] Mr. Reale's

case, it was found that he has irrational explanations that keep him from being
able to accept that he is the one responsible for his sex deviance problem which
is not uncommon with untreated sex offenders. His test results indicate he has
rationalizations, attributes, behaviors and sexual attitudes similar to those of
known sex offenders." (PSE, p.27.)
The district court acknowledged that Reale was a Vietnam War veteran
who suffers posttraumatic stress disorder likely arising from that conflict, and that
he suffers stress from his wife's illness, but pointed out that it never heard Reale
apologize to M.S. (Tr., p.55, L.23 - p.56, L.9.) Despite the fact that Reale had no
prior sex offense convictions, he admitted during his psychosexual polygraph
examination "that he fondled a 10-year-old girl who was sitting on his lap in
addition to the reports he made during his initial interviews." (PSE, pp.14-15.)
The Confidential Polygraph Report explained that, after Reale was confronted
with having a significant response to the question of whether he had had sexual
contact with anyone less than 18 years of age that he had not disclosed, he
stated, "One time a female adult was trying to sell rocks to his wife. On one of
those occasions this woman brought her daughter a (10) year old female over to
his home. During this visit this 10 year old female sat on his lap and he fondled
this female." (PSI, pp.74-75.)

14

Reale complains that the district court incorrectly concluded that
Hatzenbuehler's testing factors, relied upon by her in finding Reale was a !ow risk
to reoffend, did not take into account Reale's admission that he had engaged
similar conduct in the past (Appellant's Brief, pp, 17-18,) Regardless of whether
Reale's admission of past incidents was considered in Dr, Hatzenbuehler's risk
assessments, the fact remains that Reale previously victimized another child.
(See Tr., p.56, Ls.10-16; Appellant's Brief, pp.17-18.)
Reale claimed to have been sexually abused as a child, which the district
court expressly considered, stating:
... I recognize, Mr. Reale, that you, yourself believe that you too
were molested at a young age. Something personally as a judge
that I've never been able to grasp is how someone who may have
been molested in the past choses [sic] to molest in the future,
because, certainly, I think we all recognize and, certainly, children
recognize the harm that's caused, but I will admit that that's not an
uncommon occurrence.
(Tr., p.55, Ls.1-9.) Although Reale was also dealing with physical problems and
his wife's death, the district court was not compelled to give such presumably
mitigating factors the weight Reale ascribes to them in comparison to other
factors.

State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663, 665 (Ct. App.

1993) (a sentence need not serve all the sentencing goals or weigh each one
equally.)
In its concluding remarks, the district court reiterated that its primary goal
was the protection of society, especially young children such as M.S., stating:
And as I said, there's, you know, when you're talking about
young children, this is a very serious offense. And we're not talking
about a situation where you have a 19-year old and a 16-year old
involved in a sexual relationship. We are talking of [sic] a 67-year

15

old gentleman and an eight-year old girl. And given that disparity of
age, given that you yourself know right from wrong, and you
yourself know that such behavior with a young child is wrong, and
the fact that it has occurred in the past and this is not a first time
incident -- . . . [t]o grant probation at this time would certainly, in
this court's view, depreciate the seriousness of the offense.
(Tr., p.58, Ls.1-20.)
Given all of the information available to the district court when it imposed
sentence, Reale has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that, under any
reasonable view of the facts, his unified sentence of 15 years with three years
fixed is excessive.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Reale's judgment of
conviction and sentence, and the order of restitution.
DATED this 26 th day of August, 2014.
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